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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Wright, Daniel Patrick. M.A. Department of History, Wright State University, 2015. 
Duck and Cover: How Print Media, the U.S. Government and Entertainment Culture 
Formed America’s Understanding of the Atom Bomb 
 
 
 
This research project will explore an overview of the different subsections of American 
post-war society that contributed to the American “atomic reality” in hopes of revealing 
how and why the American understanding of atomic weapons did not slowly evolve over 
the course of a generation, but instead materialize rapidly in the years following the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By analyzing government sources and programs, 
print media sources such as newspapers and magazines, and the American entertainment 
culture of the 1940s and 1950s, this research project will answer exactly why and how the 
American public arrived at its understanding of the atom bomb.  
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I.        INTRODUCTION 
 
On a cool January evening in 1961, a B-52 bomber, flying a routine mission as 
part of the American strategic defense program, broke up over the skies of North 
Carolina. Along with its eight man crew, the American bomber was also carrying two 
“Mark 39” thermonuclear warheads.  While one, slowed by a parachute, fell harmlessly 
to earth, the second plummeted into a field about twelve miles from the city of 
Goldsboro, North Carolina. “When Air-Force experts [rushed] to the North Carolina farm 
to examine the weapon after the accident, they found that five of the six safety interlocks 
had been set off by the fall: only a single switch prevented the 24 megaton bomb from 
detonating and spreading fire and destruction over a wide area.”1 The explosive power of 
the Mark 39 would have been thousands of times larger than the warheads that were 
dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and would have surely rendered much of the 
eastern seaboard uninhabitable. What could have been the most devastating nuclear 
accident in global history was largely averted by a great deal of good fortune and luck. 
Had the bomb detonated, the world as we know it would have been dramatically 
different, and with it, America’s understanding of nuclear weapons.  
 
                                                             
1Parker Jones, Nuclear Weapons Safety Department, “Goldsboro Revisited”, October 22, 1969, 1, accessed 
January 15, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/20/goldsboro-revisited-
declassified-document. While the 1969 Parker F. Jones declassified document was originally acquired by 
Eric Schlosser for his book Command and Control, the document itself was published by the Guardian 
newspaper on September 20, 2013.  
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The bombs that fell over Goldsboro did not detonate and instead were recovered by the 
American government in the days following the accident. As time passed, the  incident 
was largely forgotten and is remembered today by an almost purposely inconsequential 
sign which states that the area was involved in a nuclear accident. The manner in which 
the Goldsboro accident receded into the pages of history speaks volumes of American 
society’s flawed understanding of nuclear weapons. Much like the paltry sign one might 
come across in a seemingly random North Carolina field, the legacy of atomic weapons 
in American society is too often one of misunderstanding. 
 
THE BOMB’S CREATION 
America’s first encounter with the atomic bomb took place during the turbulent 
years following America’s entrance into the Second World War. The secretive 
government program known as the Manhattan Project, established in 1942, included the 
development of three main research facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Los Alamos, 
New Mexico, and Hanford, Washington. While the vast majority of the workers at these 
facilities did not fully understand why they had been recruited to work in these rural 
communities, they were, in many cases, unwittingly participating in some of the most 
cutting edge and dangerous technological research that the world had ever seen. While 
describing the research as cutting edge and dangerous may conjure up images of 
enormous laboratories and perilous missile tests, in reality, the atomic frontier can more 
accurately be described as domestic and suburban. As Kate Brown observes in her book 
Plutopia, which examines the cities of Richland, Washington and Ozersk, Russia, two of 
the main plutonium producing cities of their respective countries during the Cold War, 
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the atomic frontier “generated happy childhood memories, affordable housing, and 
excellent schools in prize-winning model communities that became havens for the new 
nuclear families that inhabited them.”2 The U.S. government went to great lengths to 
ensure that its workers had an idyllic lifestyle, in spite of the fact that they were told 
nothing of what it was that they were creating.  
The Manhattan Project culminated in the world’s first successful test of an atomic 
bomb, known as the Trinity Test. The enormous investment in the Manhattan project paid 
off as the skies lit up over the New Mexico desert. Two other bombs were subsequently 
constructed and later dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, displaying 
the awe inspiring power of the atomic bomb to the public for the first time.3 The months 
and years that followed the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki spurred a cultural 
revolution in the United States and marked the dawn of the atomic age.  
 
THE ATOMIC CULTURE 
The “atomic culture” that emerged following the Second World War permeated 
every facet of American society and has indeed been covered by a multitude of authors.  
Much of the scholarly work dealing with America’s atomic culture deals with its 
transformation throughout the second half of the 20th century. While extensive research 
on the topic reveals an ever evolving society whose feelings toward atomic energy are 
constantly changing, what is often overlooked is the impact of the first two decades of 
                                                             
2 Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium 
Disasters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3.  
3 While this brief description of the Manhattan project serves the purpose of this research project, a more 
thorough analysis of the history of the Manhattan Project can be found in Richard Rhodes, the Making of 
the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1988). 
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post-war America. As Dick Van Lente observes as editor of The Nuclear Age in Popular 
Media: A Transnational History, in the first two decades after the Second World War, 
there emerged “a deluge of texts and images, ranging from serious explanation to wild 
fantasy.”4 Such efforts at embracing nuclear technology came in the form of not only 
“newspapers, illustrated magazines, and exhibitions, but also novels, comic strips, and 
films.”5  Much like the old adage that we are most impressionable as children, so too was 
the American public during the early years of the U.S. nuclear program.  
The manner in which a society comes to understand and ultimately embrace a 
technological innovation is always unique. At the time of its invention, the printing press 
was perhaps just as revolutionary as the atomic bomb, yet it lacked the awe inspiring, 
captivating display of a nuclear detonation so proudly portrayed to the American public 
in the weeks following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As Thomas Misa 
observes in his book Leonardo to the Internet “we tend to look at technology as 
cumulative and irreversible, permanent and for all time,” however, technology is far often 
more complex than this. “Machines invented in one time, or place, might well need to be 
rediscovered or reinvented” before they are accepted and utilized by their respected 
societies.6  In this way, American society’s understanding of the atomic bomb proved to 
be somewhat revolutionary. In addition to the revolutionary nature of the bomb itself, the 
secrecy surrounding it further contributed to the often misleading and in some cases, fairy 
tale narratives that emerged throughout the 1940’s and 1950’s.  Despite the complexities 
                                                             
4 Dick Van Lente, The Nuclear Age in Popular Media: A Transnational History, 1945-1965 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 2.  
5 The Nuclear age in popular media, 2.  
6 Thomas Misa, Leonardo to the Internet: Technology and Culture from the Renaissance to the Present 
(Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press, 2011), 26. 
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of nuclear fission, American society’s reaction and subsequent acceptance of the atomic 
bomb was revolutionary because it materialized so quickly.  While it took generations for 
the world to fully appreciate the societal impacts of the printing press, the U.S. public 
settled on its atomic reality within the first decade of the bomb’s inception.  
Long before the Cuban missile crisis or the Chernobyl disaster, the American 
atomic reality was shaped by forces that did not necessarily garner national headlines, nor 
did they initiate a national movement. A close analysis of print media, American post-
war culture, and government records serve as the foundation for the central argument in 
the pages to follow, which is that in stark contrast to the theory that it takes generations 
for a society to fully comprehend a technological innovation, the American atomic reality 
was born and reached maturity within the first decade of its existence, due in large part to 
the bomb’s saturation into American life, and the message it carried with it. The result 
was an American public wholly ignorant of the bomb’s destructive capacity. While this 
research project does not seek to redefine some flawed chapter of American history, it 
does succeed in dispelling some common myths about America’s past and refocuses 
analysis of U.S. nuclear history on the origins of American society’s understanding of it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
II.        Origins of the Atomic Reality 
“Nothing in all the world is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and 
conscientious stupidity.” These words, spoken by Martin Luther King in 1963, help 
frame American society at the dawn of the nuclear age and while King’s words were 
originally meant to incite outrage at the injustice of segregation, they perhaps describe, 
just as well, the emergence and evolution of American society’s understanding of atomic 
weapons.  
At the dawn of the nuclear age, the American people took a collective deep breath 
as the bloodiest war in human history drew to a close and the stress created by fear and 
uncertainty was replaced by the prospect of hope and revival. Post-war America offered 
its citizens an aura of global superiority punctuated by the emergence of a post-war 
society that was obsessed with innovation and driven by a collective love of all things 
technological. The technological innovation of the 1940’s had culminated in the creation 
of the world’s first atomic bomb, detonated first in the deserts of the U.S. Southwest and 
then subsequently put on frightening display over the heavily populated cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “Fat Man” and “Little Boy,” as the bombs were affectionately 
named, represented the defining moment when a single technological breakthrough 
effectively ended a conflict and solidified in the minds of the American people that the 
atomic bomb was a source of good, instead of a tool of utter destruction.  
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In the immediate post-war years, as American society sought to grasp the 
enormous implications of the atomic bomb, they turned to sources of information like 
newspapers and magazines, not only to read about the incredibly complex technology, 
but to view pictures of its frightening power. What they found within the pages of print 
media sources like the New York Times, TIME Magazine, Popular Science and Life 
Magazine was a narrative of the atomic bomb that often downplayed its significant 
destructive capabilities and emphasized its potential for good. As we will see in later 
chapters, this approach not only served to mislead the American public, but further 
contributed to the widespread public acceptance of the atomic bomb and the emergence 
of what is today widely known as the “atomic culture.” 
While print media played a large role in creating the atomic culture of the post-
war years, the entertainment industry played a vital role in sustaining it. The atomic 
culture which began to take shape in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s encompassed nearly 
all aspects of American life. From children’s toys like the “Atom Bomber” to drinks like 
the atomic cocktail, the atomic culture appeared in a variety of forms from coast to coast. 
Films such as The Incredible Colossal Man and It Came from Beneath the Sea offered 
their viewers a view of atomic weapons from Hollywood’s perspective, and while 
numerous movies depicted the horrors of nuclear weapons, their routine appearance in 
films of the day so soon after the invention of the atomic bomb helped cement their 
acceptance as part of American life. In addition to films, some of the world’s most 
popular comic books also emerged out of the atomic age. While Spiderman and the 
Incredible Hulk are household names today, they would not have been created were in 
not for the existence of the atomic bomb and they have an enormous following due, at 
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least in part, to their intimate connection with the American atomic culture. These few 
examples speak to how widespread the atomic culture was in post-war America, and 
while the atomic culture thrived, it could never have attained the level of acceptance that 
it did without the assistance of the U.S. government. 
Like all cultural movements, legitimacy must play a central role and in the case of 
atomic weapons the U.S. government was central to that legitimacy. John Canaday 
observed, in his research on the atomic bomb in American society, that “nuclear weapons 
employ a recently discovered and ‘mysterious’ source of energy[,] most people do not 
understand how these weapons work—or even, despite exposure to these concepts in 
high school science classes, how atoms are structured.”7 Due to this lack of 
understanding the American public was forced to turn to a number of different sources to 
provide that legitimacy. While newspapers and magazines provided the public with a 
narrative about the atomic bomb, they turned to the U.S. government for answers about 
its life threatening dangers and how Americans could best keep themselves safe. What 
may seem as misplaced trust in the American government today was far from the reality 
in the 1940’s and 1950’s when American society both respected and trusted the U.S. 
government’s advice and opinions. This willingness to trust the U.S. government played 
a central role in shaping the American atomic reality in that it resulted in a public that 
was wholly ignorant of some the bomb’s potential dangers, dangers that the American 
government either failed to communicate, or in some cases intentionally veiled from the 
wider public.  
                                                             
7 Robert Jacobs, Filling the Hole in our Nuclear Future: Art and Popular Culture Respond to the Bomb 
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 12. 
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Indeed, the dawn of the nuclear age ushered in a technology that years prior 
seemed inconceivable, something only created in a work of science fiction. The sheer 
complexity and enormity of these weapons would further hamper American popular 
culture’s representation of them simply due to the fact that “such destructive power defies 
self-defense and overwhelms imagination, frustrating our descriptive efforts.”8 Thusly, 
print media, entertainment culture, and U.S. government propaganda all played important 
roles in shaping the American atomic reality and as the chapters that follow will explain, 
although these forces differed in exactly how they influenced American thought, they all 
worked collectively to create a flawed understanding of atomic weapons.  
 
HOW AMERICA VIEWED THE BOMB 
 How was it possible for American society to not only willing accept atomic 
energy with open arms, but to do so as quickly and with such little regard for the 
seemingly obvious dangers the technology posed? The answer can be found by looking at 
how the message of the atomic bomb was packaged and delivered to the American people 
in the years following their use. The creation of the atomic bomb meant many things. It 
meant that a weapon existed that fundamentally and forever changed the art of war, it 
created a panic for civil defense planners around the globe, and it further served as a 
crowning achievement during the most technologically advanced war in modern history. 
Indeed, in military and political circles the atomic bomb created a host of problems, yet 
in the eyes of the American public it solved one. The majority of American society saw 
the atomic bomb as a symbol of war’s end, and the rise of America as an unrivaled world 
                                                             
8 Filling the Hole in our Nuclear Future, 11. 
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super power. Their understanding was not far from reality. American industrial output 
during and after the Second World War was staggering and the United States had taken a 
leading role in shaping the post-war world. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise 
that the American public had a very positive outlook in the wake the unconditional 
surrender of the Japanese and it was this very optimism that the U.S. government counted 
on to drum up support for further nuclear research in the post-war years.  
 
DEFINING THE BOMB’S ROLE 
The tactics used by the American government in the post-war years to raise 
support for further nuclear research paralleled many of those used on the atomic frontiers 
so poignantly described in Kate Brown’s Plutopia. The idyllic lifestyles created out of 
thin air on the atomic frontier served to shield workers and their families from the 
dangers associated with nuclear research and many of these same tactics were used in the 
post-war world. Kate Brown’s Plutopia serves as a perfect case study for understanding 
why and how American society developed such a flawed understanding of nuclear 
weapons in the post-war years. While Brown’s work compares and contrasts the facilities 
at and surrounding the communities of Hanford, Washington and Ozersk, Russia, there 
are some startling similarities between her findings and how the broader American 
population viewed the bomb. As she observes, “the plutonium pioneers of Richland and 
Ozersk recall never having to lock their doors, children roaming safely, friendly 
neighbors, and the absence of unemployment, indigence, and crime.”9 These highly 
desirable social characteristics were emerging from some of the most dangerous and 
                                                             
9 Brown, Plutopia, 3.  
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radioactive facilities in the world. “Of all the stops on the nuclear weapons assembly line, 
plutonium production is the dirtiest. In four decades of operation, the Hanford plutonium 
plant near Richland and the Maiak plant near to Ozersk each issued  at least 200 million 
curies of radioactivity—twice what Chernobyl emitted—into the surrounding 
environment.”10 Such staggering statistics beg the question of how such an apparently 
menacing technology could have been so universally and positively accepted. In the case 
of Ozersk and Hanford, a type of idyllic life or “Plutopia” was created to entice workers 
and their families to pick up and move their lives.11 As Brown notes, “the orderly 
prosperity of Plutopia led most eyewitnesses to overlook the radioactive waste mounting 
around them”12 thus creating an understanding of atomic weapons that was, in large 
measure, disconnected from reality.  
Much like Brown’s “Plutopia,” post-war American society suffered a similar fate, 
yet much further reaching. Due to the fact that atomic weapons dominated much of the 
early post-war conversation, it should come as no surprise that the topic permeated 
almost every aspect of American life. From box-office movies to the atomic cocktail, in 
the late 1940’s and 50’s, Americas largest population centers could seldom go twenty 
four hours without coming face to face with some facet of the atomic culture. It should 
also come as no surprise to a student of history that certain revolutionary inventions, or 
extraordinary individuals, can not only influence a time period, they often serve to define 
it.  The atomic bomb was no exception. While the emergence of an atomic culture was 
                                                             
10 Brown, Plutopia, 3.  
11 Brown, Plutopia, 4.  
12 Brown, Plutopia, 4.  
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not revolutionary in and of itself, the manner in which it was created is what one finds 
alarming.  
A recent study of Life Magazine during the Cold War, by Scott Zeman, explores 
the influence of Life and its impact on the American atomic reality with what Zeman 
terms the “bright atomic future narrative” or, the calculated steps taken by the magazine 
to cast the complex nature of nuclear technology in a positive light while, at the same 
time, steering the American public away from the realities of its destructive capacity. 
Zeman states that this “bright atomic future narrative appeared immediately after the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and seemingly offered comfort to a people who 
had just unleashed the most destructive weapon yet conceived on two cities and raised the 
specter of future atomic devastation.”13 Such tactics employed by media outlets, “not 
only served as a cultural ‘anodyne to terror’, it also served the interests of the U.S. 
government and media by focusing attention on the beneficent atom (peace) not the 
malevolent atom (war).”14 By showcasing the positive aspects of the atom bomb, the U.S. 
government and various media outlets were able to captivate the hearts and souls of 
everyday Americans and in so doing, pour the foundation of what would become a 
flawed nuclear reality. 
The following chapters will explore this fictional narrative and its roots. As stated 
previously, the atomic bomb saturated much of American culture in the post-war years, 
yet the three most significant factors influencing the American public were print media, 
popular culture, and government programs. These three elements were not simply 
                                                             
13 Scott C. Zemen, “To See…Things Dangerous to Come to: Life Magazine and the Atomic Age in the 
United States,” in The Nuclear Age in Popular Media: a Transnational History, 1945-1965, ed. Dick Van 
Lente (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 61. 
14 “To See…Things Dangerous to Come to,” 61. 
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contributing factors to a flawed understanding of atomic weapons, they were, in large 
part, responsible for creating it and in so doing, left generations of Americans wholly out 
of touch with their country’s most powerful tool of destruction.  
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III.        The Power of Print Media 
On the morning of December 8th, 1941 the front page of every newspaper across 
the United States announced in big bold letters that America had been attacked by the 
Empire of Japan, followed by a story that detailed the events of that fateful morning. The 
thoughts and opinions of the American people on both the prospect of a looming war in 
Europe and the Pacific were largely formed through newspaper and magazine articles. In 
the late 1940’s and early 1950’s there was perhaps no greater way to disseminate 
information to the masses than through print media. Magazines and newspapers provided 
Americans with daily and weekly updates on the domestic and international news of the 
time. Magazines such as LIFE, Time, and Popular Science and newspapers like The New 
York Times and the Chicago Tribune, in many ways, served as the heartbeat of American 
culture by addressing the events and stories that its readers wanted to see and read. In a 
time before the widespread emergence of nightly news programs, when televisions were 
largely reserved for only the more affluent households, the American public relied on 
magazines and newspapers to keep up with current events.  
While post-war American society was dominated by news of peace and 
prosperity, few stories garnered as much consistent attention as the atomic bomb. Images 
of its destruction were regularly printed in magazines like Life and speculation about its 
impacts in the future filled column upon column on the front pages of various print media 
across the United States. The scope and reach of print media in post-war America was 
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staggering, with Life Magazine alone reaching “21 percent of the entire population over 
ten years old, (around 22.5 million people).”15 Such a statistic truly speaks to the 
potential influence of print media in the post-war world, and by adding in the reach and 
influence of other magazines such as TIME and Popular Science, it becomes obvious just 
how much print media was responsible for molding the message of atomic weapons and, 
correspondingly, America’s understanding of them.  
One cannot overstate the far reaching influence of print media in post-war 
America. The words and images of Life Magazine had the ability to reach millions of 
people at a time and like many other popular magazines and newspapers, “engaged in 
constructing narratives about the meaning of the atomic age—in photographs and in 
text.” Such practices by major publications like Life “encouraged Americans to think 
about the meaning of the atom in formulaic ways.”16  In many ways, popular magazines 
and newspapers had a profound impact on American society and research based on the 
articles and photographs contained between their covers highlights the important trends 
and feelings of the time. In an article published in 2012, Scott C. Zeman argues that 
“American culture has long greeted technological developments such as the coming of 
the railroad or the use of electricity with utopian expectations [and] in this regard, atomic 
power was no exception.”17 At the end of the Second World War, the American public 
had peace and prosperity on their minds and while a technology such as the atomic bomb 
                                                             
15 Scott C. Zemen, “To See…Things Dangerous to Come to: Life Magazine and the Atomic Age in the 
United States,” in The Nuclear Age in Popular Media: a Transnational History, 1945-1965, ed. Dick Van 
Lente (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 54. 
16 “To See…Dangerous Things to Come to,” 54.  
17 “To See…Dangerous Things to Come to,” 61. 
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had no business being associated with the idea of peace, it nevertheless became 
synonymous with it.  
 
POPULAR MAGAZINES AND THE BOMB 
While during and after the second World War the American public subscribed to 
a multitude of popular magazines, few are more appropriate when discussing an issue as 
complex as the atomic bomb than Popular Science.  Popular Science magazine was 
capable of explaining complex scientific discoveries to a broad audience spanning the full 
spectrum of social classes.  This is an important point because it explains why a close 
examination of Popular Science articles in the years following the end of the Second 
World War can aid in understanding how American society came to view scientific 
discoveries at that time. While the post-war world was a proverbial hotbed of scientific 
discoveries, few garnered the amount of long lasting attention in magazines than the 
atomic bomb. Magazines such as Life, Time, and Popular Science “represented the 
meaning of nuclear power and the atomic age”18 and a close look at some of these articles 
reveals how. 
Popular Science magazine, while not as well known today, was one of the fastest 
growing magazine brands in 20th century America. Described as a “true reflection of 
humankind’s progress” the magazine covered a wide range of scientific stories from the 
invention of the telephone to the first automobile.19 Though Popular Science lacked the 
enormous subscription numbers boasted by magazines like Time and Life, it stood alone 
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as the voice of scientific intrigue to over 1 million Americans throughout the 1950’s.20 At 
the heart of Popular Sciences technologically inspired articles during the 1940’s and 50’s 
was the atom bomb, a singular technological development that revolutionized how the 
scientific community and more broadly, the American public viewed the world in which 
they lived. Popular Science seized this opportunity and essentially took control of the 
narrative of atomic weapons and in so doing, emerged as one of the foremost voices for 
the atomic age in American society. 
 One example of this emerging narrative can be found in the May 1949 issue in an 
article entitled “So A-Bombs Aren’t So Bad?” which provided readers with quotes from 
R. E. Lapp, a physicist who worked on the Manhattan Project, and P. M. S. Blackett, who 
had recently won the Nobel Prize in physics. These two prestigious scientists were of the 
opinion that the fear created by atomic weapons was unwarranted and they sought to 
dispel some of the myths of their time.21 Setting aside the content of the article, the title 
“So A-Bomb’s Aren’t So Bad” served to seriously mislead any potential reader because it 
misrepresents the destructive capacity of atomic weapons which had been displayed only 
four years earlier and had been responsible for the deaths of over 130,000 people. The 
title further served to misrepresent the argument of the two scientists in question. Blackett 
and Lapp based much of their argument on the immediate threat posed by atomic 
weapons as well as the defensive obstacles created by a weapon of this magnitude.22 
While the article’s title, which was most likely penned by a magazine editor rather than 
                                                             
20 “The History of Popular Science.” 
21 Volta Torrey, “So A-Bombs Aren’t So bad?” Popular Science, May 1949, 124. Accessed 14 February, 
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the authors themselves, succeeds in grabbing one’s attention, it falls appallingly short of 
accurately representing the contents of the subsequent story. The title serves as a perfect 
example of the positive narrative often constructed in post-war American print media and 
is but one of many articles that succeeded in purposefully misleading its readership.  
While the title of the May 1949 article in Popular Science was troubling enough, 
the contents of the larger article present an entirely different problem.  While Blackett 
and Lapp are certainly qualified to speak with authority about atomic weapons, their 
words serve to trivialize the deadly technology in a way that serves to further promote a 
narrative that atomic weapons are not as dangerous to Americans as they are to other 
nations.23  While such an observation would have been difficult to determine in 1949, the 
notion that the citizens of a city like Los Angeles would have been more prepared for a 
surprise nuclear attack in 1949 is absurd and only served to placate the fears of the 
American public while doing nothing to further their understanding of the technology. 
The article goes on to discuss the effect of the atomic bomb on brick structures using 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki as its case study. Blackett suggests that while initial reports 
stated that the atomic bombs dropped in August of 1945 contained the equivalent of 
30,000 tons of TNT, in actuality it was closer to 3,000 tons.24 In reality the bombs 
dropped over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been around 11 kilotons, yet, 
despite the author’s rebuttal of such an observation, the debate about the power of the 
atomic bombs and the efforts by men like Blackett to essentially lowball their destructive 
capacity, only further belittled the American perception of the technology. Historian Paul 
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Boyer further argues that to associate a nuclear weapon with such a conventional term as 
a “bomb” only further obscures the understanding of the technology and that “the use of 
the word ‘bomb’ carries with it a completely inaccurate picture of what this [device did],” 
and claiming otherwise would be like comparing how “the first feeble flight of the 
Wright brothers contrasts with the performance of today’s aircraft.”25  
An article such as this in Popular Science contribute to our understanding of how 
the narrative of atomic weapons was shaped using print media. While publishing stories 
that question the destructive capacity of atomic weapons is one way to change the atomic 
narrative in post-war America, another strategy that garnered as much attention were 
stories that suggested that atomic energy could be a source of good in the world. 
Programs such as Atoms for Peace and Operation Plowshare sought to paint atomic 
weapons with a peaceful brush, suggesting that while atomic weapons could be used as a 
weapon of war, they could also be a catalyst to spreading peace and prosperity around the 
world.  An article written in Popular Science in December of 1952, while addressing the 
recent invention of the Hydrogen bomb, states that “if the H-bomb can be made of 
peaceful and industrial use, there is a chance that it will be a blessing instead of a curse 
upon civilization.”26 While it is worth noting that nuclear technology was in its infancy, 
so too was science’s understanding of its potential benefits: to even suggest that hydrogen 
bombs could serve as a blessing to the world, while ignoring the potential for abuse, was 
a reckless approach to informing the general public. By 1949, the Soviet Union had 
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already successfully tested an atomic bomb and most scientists agreed it would only be a 
matter of time before America’s biggest security threat had tested a hydrogen bomb. To 
suggest that the creation, emergence, and proliferation of nuclear weapons could serve as 
a blessing for civilization would be similar to postulating that the invention of automatic 
weapons would simply make hunting more efficient and further reinforces how print 
media, such as Popular Science, sought to change the narrative of atomic weapons in 
American society.  
Print media’s propensity to adopt a positive narrative on nuclear weapons was 
pervasive in the post-war years and these narratives were far from unique to Popular 
Science. TIME magazine also followed the trend of highlighting the prospects of a “bright 
atomic future.” A quick search of the words “atomic bomb” in the TIME magazine digital 
archives returns over 1,000 results in the first decade and a half after the Second World 
War, one of which is an article published in 1947 entitled “Taming the Atom.” Written 
just over two years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the science section 
of TIME, this September article teases the reader with the positive potential of atomic 
weapons, and states that “atomic energy may yet do more good than harm.”27 While such 
a statement is purposely vague, it leaves a lasting impression on the reader that by 1947 
the atomic bomb presented more hope than it did potential danger. Nearly a decade later, 
long after the Soviet Union not only acquired its first atomic bomb but had also detonated 
its own hydrogen bomb, TIME magazine and many others in the print media continued to 
                                                             
27 “Taming the Atom,” TIME Magazine, September 8, 1947. Accessed January 30, 2015, 
http://content.time.com/t ime/subscriber/article/0,33009,804198,00.html.  
 
 
21 
 
write about the positive side of nuclear weapons, this time, in the business of earth 
moving.  
In an article published in March of 1958 entitled “Peaceful Atomic Blasting,” the 
editors of TIME postulate the potential benefits of nuclear weapons in road and canal 
construction.28 While the mere suggestion of such an idea today renders one utterly 
astonished, American scientists and engineers in the 1950’s and early 60’s felt as though 
the ever growing American nuclear stockpiles could be put to positive use and actively 
used print media to communicate its intentions, going as far as saying that “now it 
appears that within a few years [atomic bombs] may become man’s most powerful tool 
for fitting the earth to his use.”29  
These stories from TIME magazine are but a small sample of the hundreds of 
articles published in the years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and while not all of TIME 
magazines articles in the decades after the Second World War contained such a positive 
narrative about the atomic bomb, the stories discussed above helped lend legitimacy to 
the bright atomic future narrative that was emerging through a multitude of sources. 
While magazines like TIME and Popular Science offered their readers numerous articles 
about the atom bomb, they fell far short of covering the number of topics that 
Newspapers could with their daily issues and seemingly endless list of subscribers. 
Indeed, if popular magazines sparked the interest of the American public in the peaceful 
use of atomic weapons, the newspaper industry solidified their belief in it.  
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NEWSSTANDS AND THE BOMB 
While magazines were extremely popular in post-war America, the availability of 
newspapers, often on a twice daily basis, served as one of the most efficient means of 
informing the public and accordingly must be discussed in any conversation about 
American society’s understanding of atomic weapons. Magazines offered Americans a 
wide range of stories on a weekly or monthly basis, but newspapers offered their readers 
the latest and greatest stories as they happened. It was newspapers that first informed the 
greater public about the attack on Pearl Harbor and it was newspapers that headlined the 
end of the Second World War. What set newspapers apart from popular magazines was 
their widespread availability. From the local grocery store to the corner of Main Street, if 
the average American did not have a newspaper delivered to their house, they certainly 
had every opportunity to read one. It was the newspapers widespread availability and 
acceptance as a source of factual information that made the newspaper’s impact on the 
American atomic reality so significant in molding America’s understanding of the atom 
bomb.  
 One of more widely read newspapers in post-war America was the New York 
Times where there exists a multitude of stories that deal with the atomic bomb. One story 
in particular, published in the 27 October issue of 1957 entitled “The Great Promise of 
the Atomic Age” discusses the potential good that atomic technology could bring to the 
world. While stories that discuss the potential benefits of the atomic bomb cannot be 
summarily categorized as a detriment to America’s understanding of the technology, 
when they are discussed in such a way as to only highlight the positives, or at times, 
greatly exaggerate the potential benefits, they only serve to misinform the public. The 
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headline used to grab the reader’s attention in this October issue states that “the 
peacetime atom can make the wartime atom obsolete, and if it does it offers all mankind 
the hope of harmony, plenty and a longer life to enjoy them.”30 While the headline serves 
to comfort its readers, it summarily ignores the potential dangers of atomic weapons and 
over-simplifies their potential for peaceful use. The invention of gunpowder initially 
offered cities a tool to expand roads and move mountains, though in reality, the 
invention’s peaceful uses were dwarfed by its more sinister applications. In this respect, 
atomic weapons were no different. While splitting the atom offered the world a new 
source of energy whose power was unmatched, to assume that global society would only 
embrace such a technology for its potential benefits is evidence of a seriously flawed 
view of human nature and ignores the often impractical mindset of some world leaders.  
It may be human nature to either see the potential for good or to be predisposed to believe 
that good will come of every technological advance: such is not always the case. 
 While the New York Times piece on atomic weapons is introduced by a 
misleading headline, what is perhaps more troubling is the content of the article itself. 
The second paragraph of the article, while contrasting the potential power of nuclear 
weapons, states that “man could build an industrial civilization with a standard of living 
that would satisfy all his material wants to an extent never dreamed of.”31 Such a 
statement, which serves as the broad thesis of the article, not only suggests that nuclear 
weapons could potentially be a good thing, but quite plainly states that atomic energy can 
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supply the reader with all the material wants they could ever need or imagine.  Such a 
sentiment is dangerous not only because it is misleading, but also because it aids in 
creating a state of mind that associates atomic energy with a technology of limitless 
potential, instead of limitless destruction. While atomic energy was indeed revolutionary 
in the 1940’s and 50’s, and had untapped potential as a source of energy, to suggest in 
1957 that the technology could fulfill all of the American public’s hopes and dreams 
serves no other purpose than misleading those who chose to read about it.  
 The 21st century and the emergence of the U.S. nuclear program brought with it 
the promise of an infinite amount of power. As was stated in the previous New York 
Times article, by splitting the atom the United States had harnessed the greatest potential 
for power in the world and because the positive spin often associated with nuclear power, 
military and civilian leaders were calling for its expansion. In an article published in July 
1956, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover testified in front of the House Appropriations 
Committee, urging them to finance nuclear power.32 While his testimony should come as 
no surprise from a man who was the chief of the naval reactors branch of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the suggestion of atomic expansion was, at the time, nothing much 
more than a Cold War strategy to match the Soviet Union’s nuclear expansion.  Lewis 
Straus, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, “expressed concern that the Soviet 
Union would outstrip the United States unless this country ‘did something drastic 
immediately.’”33 Looking back on such statements today, it is easy to see how the United 
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States often used the Cold War competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to gain 
funding in certain areas like nuclear research without having to address some of the more 
pressing problems that such research unearthed.  
 The articles discussed above are evidence of two things. First, print media was 
often used as a podium to construct a positive narrative of the atomic bomb. Indeed, in 
the first decade after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the New York Times 
published over 1,000 articles that make reference to the atomic bomb and peace, which 
speaks to not only the amount of coverage that the atomic bomb received, but the 
peaceful message that was often associated with it. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War and the decade after, the Times printed countless articles detailing the 
potential good of nuclear weapons to both stem the fears of war wary Americans and 
associate the technology with peace and prosperity in hopes of pleasing the populous.. 
Secondly, these articles serve as perfect examples of how America’s misunderstanding of 
atomic power could prove to be beneficial in attaining both government funds and public 
support.  While the atomic bomb technologically possessed incredible power, the 
influence it carried, and the culture it spurred throughout the United States, proved 
equally powerful. It would be a historical leap to assume that the construction of this 
bright atomic narrative was intentional on the part of the Times, yet the sheer number of 
articles speaks volumes of a corporation that was churning out stories that it thought the 
public would like to read, further perpetuating a flawed atomic reality. 
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IMAGERY IN PRINT MEDIA 
While the written word offers the most literal way of understanding how print 
media manipulated America’s understanding of atomic weapons, the images used in 
newspapers and magazines also played a vital role in shaping the American atomic 
reality.  The impact of an image varies from person to person:  the images that emerged 
from Japan in the days following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki quite rightfully 
had a lasting impact on the American psyche. The enormity of the destruction had 
seemed incomprehensible when one read about them in newspapers and magazines, but 
the images from Japan that emerged in the weeks and months after the bombing spoke to 
the true destructive capacity of atomic weapons. As Paul Boyer reveals in his research on 
the American atomic reality “all of the major elements of our contemporary engagement 
with the nuclear reality took shape literally within days of Hiroshima.”34 Ironically, the 
America public was best informed about the atomic bomb in the days and weeks after the 
bombing: its understanding of the deadly technology were manipulated in the years after.  
While Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the only two occasions the world had to 
experience the utter destruction of atomic weapons on a civilian population, in the decade 
after the dust settled in Japan, the two cities began to serve as examples of what atomic 
bombs were not. Fat Man and Little Boy, the two bombs dropped over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, in terms of yield, were two of the smallest atomic bombs that the United States 
manufactured and were a mere fraction of the size of the bombs that inadvertently fell to 
the ground over Goldsboro, North Carolina. The images in LIFE magazine in October 
1945 showed the indiscriminate destruction of Hiroshima: four years later, in October 
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1949, they showed the same landscape resurrected from the dead35 and served to mislead 
the public with respect to how atomic weapons generally work.  Fat Man and Little Boy 
were detonated high above their intended targets, causing utter destruction, but 
simultaneously limiting the amount of radioactive fallout. While Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were completely destroyed, they were quickly rebuilt into two of the most beautiful cities 
in the world. The photos from LIFE associated atomic weapons with temporary 
destruction, something characteristic of all contemporary bombs, yet it is the long lasting 
and invisible killer of radiation that makes atomic weapons so uniquely devastating. 
Despite years of nuclear testing and an ever evolving understanding of atomic weapons 
throughout the Cold War, the American public still today clings to the only use of the 
atomic bomb on an actual civilian target, and have consequently been unable to fully 
distinguish between the atom bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the larger 
thermonuclear bombs developed in the 1950s.  
While the preceding paragraphs highlight some of the misleading narratives of 
nuclear technology that were often pursued by the American print media, one must be 
careful not to cast print media as being completely one sided. There were numerous 
articles published in both newspapers and magazines that spoke of the true nature of 
nuclear weapons, and in the case of an August 1959 story in TIME magazine, offered 
readers a fair and balanced assessment of the realistic risks associated with the atomic 
bomb. Entitled “Atomic ABC’s,” the article addresses a number of common question 
associated with the bomb and offers honest, and in some instances, blunt responses.36 
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When addressing the question of what one could do in the event an atomic bomb 
exploded nearby, the author states “for those directly under an air burst there may be no 
warning; there is nothing they can do.”37 Articles such as “Atomic ABC’s” are proof that 
print media sought to alert the American public to the danger of atomic weapons, it was 
much more productive to espouse the many advantages to embracing nuclear technology 
instead of demonizing it.  
While print media played an integral role in shaping America’s flawed 
understanding of nuclear weapons, they did not do so by themselves. The “atomic 
culture” that emerged out of the Second World War took several years to develop and 
there were many contributing factors that will be discussed in later chapters. The 
preceding paragraphs are not suggesting that all newspaper and magazine articles about 
the atomic bomb portrayed only the positive narrative, but rather draws attention to the 
influence that these articles had on the American populace. The manner in which the 
American public embraced the atomic bomb in the post-war years was not passive, but 
continually active. While print media played a vital role, American’s infatuation with the 
atomic bomb could not have spread as widely, nor affected so many without the 
entertainment culture that formed around it. 
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IV.        POPULAR CULTURE 
 
38 
 
The atomic cocktail serves as just one of many examples of the impact the atomic 
bomb had on American culture in the 1940’s, 50’s, and 60’s. Indeed, there are numerous 
scholarly works that address the rapid emergence of what has been termed an “atomic 
culture” in post-war America.39 From feature films and comic books to children’s toys 
and popular drinks, the atomic bomb played a vital role in shaping post-war American 
society and culture and consequently, played a central role in fostering an inherently 
flawed atomic reality. While print media and visual images of the atomic bomb served as 
reactionary sources of how the United States understood the technology, as time passed 
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and the influential tide of those images began to slowly recede from the American 
consciousness, a semblance of normalcy returned to a country ready for peace and 
prosperity. It was this collective hope for prolonged peace, coupled with an entertainment 
industry which saw tremendous monetary potential in nuclear technology that produced 
the atomic culture in American society. A close look at the different ways in which the 
atomic bomb and associated technology were universally revered by a large cross section 
of American society will aid in understanding not only why Americans so readily 
embraced the atomic bomb, but more importantly, how that embrace contributed to an 
almost willing ambivalence to its destructive capacity. 
  
THE ATOMIC BOMB AND AMERICA’S YOUTH 
           We begin this examination of the atomic culture in the United States by exploring 
how it catered to the youngest cross section of the U.S. population. While the awe 
inspiring power of atomic weapons captivated the minds of all ages, its complexity was 
quite understandably lost on young children who served only to benefit from the 
emergence of the technology. In the years following Hiroshima and Nagasaki, numerous 
toys and games began to appear on store shelves and under Christmas trees. As early as 
1947, the atom bomb was being used for commercial gain by the Kix Cereal Company 
which began marketing the Lone Ranger Atomic Ring. This small gold colored ring had a 
plastic atomic bomb clipped to the top of it with a small lens with which one could look 
through and view images of split atoms. The advertisements that ran for this ring were 
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accompanied by cartoons entitled “How Tommy Thwarted the Enemy Agents.”40 While 
these rings, marketed by one of the largest cereals brands in America, instilled a sense of 
joy and wonder in the minds of American children by themselves, they had the added 
appeal of being associated with the Lone Ranger. First appearing before American 
audiences in the mid 1930’s the Lone Ranger captivated the minds of America’s youth 
with its themes of adventure and heroism. Such appeals to young children is alarming: if 
America’s youth grow up without any sense of worry about the atomic bomb, they will 
likely carry those feelings into adulthood, thus generationally creating a cross section of 
society conceivably out of touch with reality.  While representing an obvious attempt by 
the Kix Cereal company to exploit the awe inspiring power of the atomic bomb with 
childhood action hero’s, the Lone Ranger atomic ring of the late 1940’s was one of the 
more benign examples of how American toy manufacturers exploited America’s apparent 
fascination with nuclear technology to their advantage. While the atomic ring did 
inevitably contribute to the emerging atomic culture, bigger and larger toys that began to 
appear in the 1950’s and 60’s carried with them a much more malignant message.  
              The reason that children’s toys play such a central role in shaping the American 
atomic reality is that they aid in legitimizing the society’s collective embrace of atomic 
weapons. Associating something with fun and games inevitably causes people to fear it 
less. It should come as no surprise that the atomic culture catered to young children, who 
represented a subsection of the American populous that were not only extremely 
impressionable, but also intimately linked to their arguably less impressionable parents. 
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While one may find toys such as “the atomic ring” and other small trinkets difficult to 
link to the wider flaw of America’s atomic reality, some of the larger, more complex toys 
that began to emerge in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s did not merely result in cheap 
thrills, they also represented a direct appeal to the younger generation’s imagination. 
The atomic bomb ushered in a new era for America’s youth and in the years 
following its debut, there was little doubt about how young people would associate with 
the atomic bomb.  One example of this can be seen with the “atomic bomb game” that 
emerged in the 1940’s. This game included a cardboard map of Japan with holes 
representing the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The object of the game was to drop 
small replicas of atomic bombs from above and have them land in the holes in order to 
score points.41 Another very similar game encouraged children to “practice bombing, 
improve your score [and] be the ace of your own air corps.”42  
While toys were undoubtedly the most common ways in which the youth of 
America identified with atomic technology, popular children’s books and comic strips 
also jumped on the atomic bandwagon, perhaps the most popular being the Tom Swift 
book collection. The first series of Tom Swift was published in 1910 and ran up until the 
beginning of the Second World War. The second series, which was first published in 
1954, featured plots centered around the scientific and technological breakthroughs of the 
second half of the 20th century, and, in many instances, quite accurately predicted the 
technology of the future. However, Tom Swift children’s novels captivated the minds of 
its young readers with page turning adventure, the themes found within its pages are even 
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more “instructive in their depiction of the growth of American technology and the 
corporate industrial system.”43 While many of the Tom Swift books published before the 
1940’s often sensationalized the potential of scientific endeavor, the emergence of the 
atomic bomb ushered in a new era of scientific potential on par with the invention of 
electricity and the telephone. Books such as “The Atomic Earth Blaster” and “In the 
Caves of Nuclear Fire” serve as perfect examples of how the Tom Swift series used 
atomic and nuclear technology to captivate the imagination of its young audience and use 
the newly discovered technology to legitimize what in years prior would have been idol 
fantasy. “The Atomic Earth Blaster” was described by the author as a “machine that 
looked like a gigantic torpedo and was comprised of three main parts. Mounted to a 
heavy swivel base was a long gleaming steel cylinder which could be tilted in any 
direction [and] housed a compact atomic pile to power the implement.”44 The enormous 
machine was “armed with a pair of revolving discs which could chew into the hardest 
rock.”45  
 The atomic earth blaster, just one of the genre’s many scientific inventions that 
fueled the imaginations of America’s youth, is of specific importance because of the 
underlying message it conveyed. While children’s toys and games often glamorized 
atomic technology, it was a technology that was already in existence. The Tom Swift 
collection went a step farther by imagining the potential good that future atomic 
inventions could offer. Tom Swift Jr., the protagonist of the novel, is cast as a hero, 
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someone who uses his inventions to better the world and by associating atomic 
technology with his inventions, one begins to view atomic technology in a positive light. 
Tom Swift Jr. is even celebrated at the end of the book when his father tells him that he 
will be “swamped with newsreel and television cameramen.”46 This celebration of atomic 
energy was not unique to the Tom Swift novels and as will be shown, was indicative of 
the wider acceptance of atomic technology by the American public. 
 
THE ATOMIC BOMB IN AMERICAN LIFE 
 The idea that children were desensitized to the wider dangers of the atomic bomb 
and nuclear technology is by itself not all that alarming. However, at the dawn of the 
nuclear age, it was not merely children who were affected by the ever growing cultural 
boom of post-war America, adults also became all too comfortable and were more than 
willing to associate the atomic bomb with a sense of joy and wonder. Thousands of 
people traveled to Las Vegas in the early 1950’s not only to enjoy the allure of its many 
casinos, but also to catch a glimpse of an atomic detonation.  The United States 
performed 1,030 nuclear tests throughout the Cold War,47 the majority of which took 
place at what was formerly an air force bombing range 100 kilometers north of the famed 
Las Vegas Strip.48 Onlookers flocked from all over the country to catch a glimpse of the 
revolutionary technology and in doing so created a popular stop for Americans on the 
atomic frontier. Postcards were created depicting a mushroom cloud in the backdrop of 
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the Las Vegas skyline as the theme of atomic weapons began to expand exponentially. 
While the blasts themselves posed little risk to those watching from such a great distance, 
the droves of individuals who consistently traveled to the Las Vegas strip to see the 
detonations highlights just how accepting the American public had already become of 
atomic weapons as early as 1951. Not only was the average American unconcerned about 
the potential risk associated with witnessing an atomic detonation, in some cases they 
expended exorbitant amounts of money to witness one.  The Nevada test site and its 
many atomic and nuclear tests were but a small stop on the atomic frontier, and as will be 
seen, the theme of atomic weapons only continued to grow throughout the second half of 
the 20th century to penetrate nearly every aspect of American life.  
One of the better known, if seldom understood, aspects of the atomic age was the 
emergence of bomb shelters. In an effort to challenge the emerging threat of the Soviet 
Union and its plan of global supremacy through nuclear destruction, the U.S. government 
created the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) in 1951. While the emergence 
and motivation of the shelter program will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four, it 
is important to address it in a cultural respect due to the way in which it affected the 
everyday lives of American society.  
If the goal of the civil defense authorities was to construct a large number of air 
raid and fallout shelters across the United States, it fell markedly short. Due to a lack of 
funding, the U.S. civil defense program served largely as an advisor to the American 
public, providing information on how to construct, stock, and manage bomb shelters. The 
American government, as well as popular print media sources, actively promoted plans 
aimed at protecting the American public from a potential nuclear strike. In the post-war 
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years this do-it-yourself mentality was marked by very stark gender roles. For men, it 
provided an opportunity for them to demonstrate their masculinity, taking a central role in 
protecting their families from the dangers of the atomic bomb.49 Indeed, the prominence 
of the male role in the atomic age is not all that surprising, yet what one finds truly 
fascinating are the traditional gender roles that emerged through the creation of the civil 
defense authorities and how such roles served to domesticate the atom bomb.  
 “During the 1950’s and early 1960’s the atomic bomb was largely feminized and 
domesticated” which in many ways contributed to a decidedly deficient understanding of 
the risks that it posed.50 In a 1999 article Susan Stoudinger observes that often times 
families were given specific roles to play to ensure the safety and security of their home 
in the event of a nuclear attack. While men were tasked with jobs such as building the 
shelters and maintaining their structural integrity, women were assigned specific tasks 
such as keeping the shelter tidy and neat, as well as keeping it well stocked with canned 
goods and water. The message conveyed to the American family through the civil 
defense authorities and numerous popular magazines and newspapers was a simple one; 
“if simple instructions are followed, most citizens will be saved.”51 This narrative of a 
bright atomic future that was being shaped by the civil defense authorities and willingly 
propagated by numerous print media sources associated incredibly simplistic tasks with 
nuclear safety and in so doing, erected a façade, shielding families from a more realistic 
understanding of the dangers that atomic weapons and nuclear technology posed.  
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The domestication of the bomb during the 1940’s and 50’s placed women at the 
head of the household, alongside their husbands and sons. While the bomb had initially 
emerged “as a symbol of overwhelming strength and power in a world of competition and 
contest,” the emergence of the U.S. civil defense program of the early 1950’s served to 
feminize the bomb by “mobiliz[ing] the domestic world of women.”52 While men were 
often depicted as the one’s constructing the shelters, “women, on the other hand, are 
depicted engaged in domestic tasks such as tending children, stocking the pantry, or 
decorating.”53 One particular advertisement, published in TIME magazine “depicts the 
typical division of labour promoted by shelter literature: Mr. Smith and his son cement 
the shelter wall while his daughter decorates it by painting a ‘picture window.’”54 Such 
examples not only reveal how traditional gender roles became associated with shelter 
construction, but also how the bomb itself became domesticated to the point that it 
became a normal part of American life. This domestication of the bomb and the U.S. 
governments’ goal of enlisting women as a primary fighting force alongside men on the 
home front served to further obscure the real threats the atomic bomb posed. It was the 
goal of the (FCDA) to enlist as much of the population as possible to embrace the idea of 
atomic safety, yet, in many ways it fostered a population wholly ignorant of it.  
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MOVIES, TELEVISION AND THE BOMB 
 As scholars have noted, “In the years following World War II, television came of 
age and became an important force in forming public opinion.”55 While televisions were 
not embraced by a large cross section of the American public in the first few years after 
the war’s end, “during the 1950s, as television sets became more affordable and 
programing more varied, millions of Americans brought televisions into their homes, 
making it the dominant mass media.”56 Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the 
atomic age was the seemingly endless list of movies and television series which 
incorporated atomic technology into their plot lines or, in some cases, had an atomic 
theme at their core. Films such as “Split Second,” a story about several escaped convicts 
who seek shelter in a ghost town where the government intended to test an atomic bomb, 
featured atomic technology as a way to make the film more exciting. If audiences were 
not captivated by the escaped convicts fight for survival, they most certainly would be 
transfixed by the impending glimpse of an atomic bomb.57 Movies like “Split Second” 
and others feature the atomic bomb as an enticing bonus to the plot: movies such as 
“Godzilla,” “Attack of the Crab Monsters,” “It Came from Beneath the Sea,” and “The 
Magnetic Monster” lean on the use of atomic technology as a justification for their 
otherwise implausible plots.  
 Perhaps the best known film from the atomic age, if not one of the best science 
fiction films of all time was Ishiro Honda’s 1954 classic “Godzilla”. Originally filmed 
and released in Japan, the film was later adapted for American audiences in 1956. 
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“Godzilla,” measuring over 150 feet tall, was born out of the U.S. nuclear tests in the 
Bikini Islands which had tragically killed several Japanese fishermen and sparked global 
outrage about the potential dangers of nuclear radiation. The film’s plot centers on the 
giant monster’s rampage of Japan and as Steve Ryfle observes in his 2005 article on the 
subject, the monster’s destruction of Japan represents a broader metaphor of a nuclear 
holocaust.58 The film’s producer, Tomoyuki Tanaka, states that “the theme of the film, 
from the beginning, was the terror of the bomb. Mankind had created the bomb and now 
nature was going to take revenge on mankind.”59 While this sub-plot was most likely lost 
on the film’s millions of viewers, it, and a seemingly endless list of films like it, used the 
atomic bomb and nuclear technology to captivate audiences and rationalize the 
emergence of otherwise implausible science fiction films. 
 Films such as “Godzilla” and “The Magnetic Monster” dominated box offices 
around the world, however, they largely referenced atomic technology as a secondary 
element to the main story. Atomic technology had been responsible for the creation of the 
great beast that was Godzilla, yet it is seldom discussed or referenced in the latter half of 
the film. In stark contrast, films such as “The Atomic Kid” and “The Incredible Shrinking 
Man” incorporated atomic technology as the a primary driver of the films’ plot lines and 
use the technology as a crutch from the opening credits to the final scenes. The 1954 
comedy “The Atomic Kid” features Mickey Rooney as a young bumbling buffoon who 
unknowingly wanders into a fake town which is scheduled to be blown up as part of a 
nuclear test. After receiving large amounts of radiation, he is recruited by the F.B.I. to 
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break up a spy ring.60 Along a similar plot line, “The Incredible Shrinking Man” featured 
Grant Williams, whose character is shrunk down to the size of a small bug after exposure 
to radiation.61 Conversely, the film “The Amazing Colossal Man” features a protagonist 
who is exposed to a nuclear test and while being burned on over ninety percent of his 
body, begins to grow to enormous proportions. Films such as these used the atom bomb 
and the dangers associated with it, such as radiation, as the central theme of their 
respective plots. If the atom bomb had never been invented, movies like “The Atomic 
Kid” and “The Incredible Shrinking Man” would not and could not exist in their present 
form, and serve as examples of how even the most destructive and cynical technologies 
can be viewed in a positive light.  
 The film industry was far from the only way electronic media capitalized on the 
emergence of atomic energy. Numerous television shows featured the atomic bomb in 
hopes of exploiting the latest trend in American culture. Perhaps one of the most famous 
examples of the atomic bomb infiltrating American television was the Twilight Zone 
episode “Shelter.” The episode revolves around a friendly dinner party that is suddenly 
interrupted by a civil defense warning of a possible nuclear attack. The previously 
friendly party guests turn against one another as they desperately attempt to enter the 
homeowner’s air-raid shelter. Upon realizing the shelter could not hold all of the guests, 
the family is forced to turn against them and lock them out. As the half-hour show came 
to its climactic conclusion, it is revealed that the potential threat was nothing more than 
space debris and in fact, not an atomic bomb. As the show ends, the characters are left 
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wondering if the atomic bomb had not destroyed their physical lives, had their fear of it 
destroyed their relationships.62 The Twilight Zone episode “Shelter” raised some 
uncomfortable questions among its viewership and serves to highlight just how much the 
American people did not wish to actually think about the dangers of the bomb.  
 
MUSIC AND THE ATOM BOMB 
While television and movies provided the American public with visual 
representations of the atomic bomb, the music industry further defined the atomic culture 
in the United States through a seemingly endless list of atom bomb themed music. 
Popular songs were being steadily created in the early to mid-1950s as the music industry 
began to explore genres that would define the post-war world and cater to the emerging 
atomic culture of the late 1940s and 1950s. One song by The Five Stars, written, in 1957 
perfectly framed the atomic age with a lyrical tone associating atomic and nuclear 
technology with everyday conversation.  
Got a doll, baby, I love her so 
Nothing else like her anywhere you go 
Man, she's anything but calm 
A regular pint sized atom bomb 
 
Refrain: Atom bomb baby, little atom bomb 
I want her in my wigwam 
She's just the way I want her to be 
A million times hotter than TNT 
 
Atom bomb baby loaded with power 
Radioactive as a TV tower 
A nuclear fission in her soul 
Loves with electronic control63 
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By comparing his woman’s nature to an atom bomb, the song writer is able to create a 
catchy tune that simultaneously appeals to an American society who could not get 
enough exposure to the new technology. Another musical number performed by Little 
Caesar and the Red Callender Sextette entitled, “Atomic Love,” uses the awesome power 
of an atomic detonation to describe the feelings and emotions associated with love.  
 
Boooom! 
Something exploded down inside 
And rushed tears up in my eyes 
Oh yes, I have that funny feeling 
I guess it's my atomic love for you 
Crash! 
Something shattered in my mind 
And sent cold chills right down my spine 
Oh yes, I have that funny feeling 
I guess it's my atomic love for you 
 
I can't realize, 
But I will apologize 
For all that I've done wrong 
There's no need of pretending 
Our love will have no ending 
I'll dream ‘til every day is done64 
 
While the lyrics from the songs above and the many others that played over radios 
and televisions across post-war America did not necessarily shape the American 
understanding of atomic weapons by themselves, they nevertheless served to further 
saturate American society with a feel good celebration of atomic technology. 
As was noted at the beginning of the chapter, the atomic bomb infiltrated nearly 
every aspect of American society in the first decade after the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Alongside the bomb’s presence in the entertainment industry, it could also be 
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readily found in the beverage industry. The creation of the atomic bomb sparked a 
nationwide obsession with the technology, fueled somewhat by fear, but more so by hope 
for the future. Restaurants and bars accordingly took advantage of this atomic fascination 
by creating a series of drinks centered around the new and dangerous technology. 
“Although it was a short-lived fad, the Atomic Cocktail was used to elevate the spirits of 
Americans who were buoyed by postwar optimism, but still made edgy by the dark cloud 
of East-West conflict. With time, the prospects for peace improved and the good time 
rolled”65 as drinks such as the “Rocket Man” and “Apricot Fission”, which, while 
offering little that was new in the way of taste, contained fun descriptions and provided 
people with an outlet for their atomic fix. The most famous drink from the atomic age, 
the atomic cocktail itself, even spawned a famous blue’s song which celebrated the 
drink’s ability to stimulate its owner’s taste buds.  
It's the drink that you don't pour 
Now when you take one sip you won't need anymore 
You're small as a beetle or big as a whale-BOOM-Atomic Cocktail. 
 
Splashes ice all around the place 
When you see it coming, grab your suitcase 
It'll send you through the sky like airmail-BOOM-Atomic Cocktail. 
 
You push a button, turn a dial 
Your work is done for miles and miles 
When it hits-it's bound to shake 'cause it feels just like an earthquake. 
 
That's the drink that you don't pour 
When you take one sip you won't need anymore 
You're small as a beetle or big as a whale-BOOM-Atomic Cocktail.66 
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The emergence and spread of atomic cocktails in the 1950’s serve as proof of two things. 
First, it demonstrates that the American beverage and advertising industry recognized the 
American fascination with atomic and nuclear weapons in the first decade after the 
Second World War and secondly, willingly took advantage of this newly realized atomic 
fixation as a way to profit. The existence of atomic cocktails also serves as proof of just 
how well integrated the atomic bomb had become in American society in the mid-1950’s. 
The preceding paragraphs serve to highlight just how pervasive and far-reaching 
the atomic culture was in the United States. Viewing the atomic age as a Cold War 
phenomena is misleading because it also leads one to assume that the atomic age in 
American society emerged gradually over the course of a Cold War that lasted nearly half 
a century. In reality, while the atomic culture of the United States was constantly 
evolving throughout the Cold War, it’s genesis and fundamental form emerged in the late 
1940’s and 1950’s and only picked up speed and grew in size as the American public’s 
love of atomic technology continued to grow. Our current understanding of the atomic 
age in American society centers around the way in which it shaped and molded U.S. 
culture: what is too often ignored is just how detrimental and counter-productive that 
culture was to the development of a well-informed understanding of the bomb and the 
technology associated with it. 
 For decades, the atomic bomb penetrated every facet of the average American’s 
life. From the newspapers and comic strips one read during breakfast, to the drinks one 
shared with clients after work, to the toys and games young children played with. This 
brief analysis of the atomic age in American culture serves as clear and convincing 
evidence with respect to how and why the American people formed such a flawed atomic 
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reality in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The atom bomb had 
become so ingrained in the psyche of the United States that people simply stopped 
consciously thinking about it. Whether it was seeing the actual technology’s awesome 
power from the Las Vegas strip or seeing it simulated in the ever growing number of 
movies and television shows, the atom bomb had been transformed from America’s best 
kept secret to its most profitable commodity.  
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V.        THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE ATOMIC BOMB 
 While the previous chapters have shown how integrated the atom bomb was in 
American culture throughout the first decade of the Cold War, merely documenting the 
differing ways in which it impacted American society does not sufficiently explain how 
and why the American public formed such a flawed understanding of it. While it is 
indeed true that newspapers and magazines, movies, and television shows served to 
collectively numb the U.S. public to the greater complexities of the atom bomb, to 
understand why the public felt comfortable making such assumptions, we must look to 
the U.S. government and its extensive propaganda campaign of the late 1940’s and 
1950’s.  
 In the years following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. 
government found itself in a unique situation. It had just successfully created and 
detonated the world’s first atomic bomb and was now faced with the difficult task of 
selling the most destructive device in human history to the American public as a force for 
good. While such a task may seem daunting to us today, it is important to understand that 
in stark contrast to the 21st century, post-war American society had a great deal of trust in 
its government. While President Harry Truman’s approval rating dwindled by the end of 
his second term, his successor Dwight Eisenhower enjoyed some of the highest 
presidential approval ratings of the 20th century, with an average of 65% of the American 
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population rallying behind Eisenhower in the early to mid-1950s.67 In addition to the high 
approval ratings, by the mid 1950’s, the United States had established itself as the 
supreme industrial superpower. The American public did indeed have a great deal of trust 
in its government and it was this misplaced confidence that enabled the American 
government to carefully shape the American public’s perception of the bomb.  
It is no secret that during the immediate post-war years the American government 
had a vested interest in how the American public felt about atomic technology. Not only 
did the atom bomb contribute to ending the war in the Pacific, it put to rest any doubt that 
the United States was the unrivaled military power in the world. Before the last fires were 
put out in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the American public had already begun 
formulating opinions on the atomic bomb, most of which were positive. In the first 
months and years after the bombing, the U.S. government saw a tremendous opportunity 
to control the narrative of this new, complex technology. This narrative came in many 
forms, whether it was the U.S. shelter and duck and cover programs, which knowingly 
mislead the public about the dangers posed by atomic weapons, or the atoms for peace 
initiatives, aimed at promoting the potential benefits of the atom bomb. It is abundantly 
clear that in the first decade of the Cold War, the American government designed and 
implemented an extremely effective propaganda campaign aimed at creating a flawed 
understanding of atomic weapons on behalf of the American public.  
It may make sense to postulate that the American government should have cared 
little about how the public felt about the atomic bomb. It would have been safe to assume 
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that it was viewed in somewhat of a positive light, even if such a view carried with it a 
degree of fear and uncertainty. In the eyes of most Americans, the atom bomb 
represented an unrivaled bargaining chip towards post-war supremacy, a crowning 
achievement marking the end of war and the rise of America’s scientific and 
technological prowess globally. Yet, a close look into key declassified government 
documents from 1947 reveals just how closely the American government tracked and 
controlled how its wider population felt about the atom bomb.   
 Less than two years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. 
government commissioned a study by Richard S. Crutchfield of Swarthmore College 
concerning the public attitudes about the atomic bomb. The report stresses “the critical 
importance of more adequate knowledge of the thinking of the American public on 
matters relating to the development of the atomic bomb” and as a result of this need to 
understand, “the Social Science Research Council proposed early in 1946 that a study of 
public opinion and attitudes in these areas be undertaken.”68 The report aimed at 
resolving several questions in regards to public opinion. First, it sought to determine the 
significance of the Bikini island naval test on the formation of opinions among those who 
were surveyed. To accomplish this, the questionnaire was given to 3090 individuals 
before and 2894 individuals after the Bikini test, in hopes that a stark difference of 
opinion might emerge with the appropriate size for the post-war U.S. navy. A second 
goal of the survey was to explore just how informed the average American was about 
issues such as the atomic bomb and international relations. Finally, the survey sought to 
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reveal how safe the American public felt in regards to atomic attack, and more 
specifically, if civil defense measures could and would be effective at keeping America 
safe.69 
 While not all of the findings in Crutchfield’s 1946-47 report improve our 
understanding of the development of public opinion on the atomic reality in America, 
several key sections reveal how misinformed the American people were in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War and how the U.S. government was advised to use 
such a lack of understanding to its advantage. The Bikini Island test serves as a perfect 
baseline in understanding how the American public understood atomic weapons at the 
dawn of the atomic age. Operation Crossroads, as it was known to those involved in the 
1946 test, was designed to test and analyze the impact that an atomic detonation would 
have on warships at sea. The test consisted of two bombs that were detonated underwater 
and surrounded by warships of varying sizes and at varying distances away from the blast 
center. Crutchfield’s study was intended to ascertain how much the population knew 
about the Bikini island test both before and after it was conducted. The 1946 study 
revealed that while a majority of Americans were aware of the Bikini island tests, “a 
majority expressed their feeling that the Bikini test did less damage than they had 
expected it to do.”70 While Crutchfield’s report addresses a variety of questions ranging 
from the bomb’s construction, to its international control and prevention it emphasizes 
that “the most prominent effect of the Bikini test seems to be that concerned with the fact 
that the majority of people expected the test to do more damage than they think it did.”71  
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 Such findings by the Crutchfield study are telling in that they reveal that the 
American public lacked an appreciation and understanding of the true power of atomic 
technology. While a majority of respondents felt that the atom bomb would someday 
represent a threat to the United States, and even went further by advocating that the 
technology be strictly controlled by the U.S., the study also revealed that the American 
people were of the opinion that the bomb that was far from apocalyptic and instead were 
both positive and hopeful. These positive associations can be seen in the section of the 
report dealing with civil defense. When respondents were asked if they “believe that the 
U.S. will be able to develop a defense against the atomic bomb,” the majority of those 
polled believed that the U.S. government would be able to develop an adequate civil 
defense program that would keep Americans safe in the event of a nuclear war.72 It 
should really come as no surprise that Americans believed their government could protect 
them against atomic weapons. While it was widely known that the atomic bomb was the 
pinnacle of modernized warfare, it does not seem unreasonable that the nation who split 
the atom, could develop a form of protection against its awesome power.  
 
CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE SHELTER MOVEMENT 
 While there are seemingly countless primary documents available that highlight 
the inherent flaws of the U.S. civil defense movement of the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, 
the most well-known and appropriate example was the 1951 Anthony Rizzo directed film 
“Duck and Cover” starring Bert the turtle. Intended to be used as an educational tool 
directed at America’s youth, the video depicted Bert the turtle being followed around by 
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a stick of dynamite on a string, symbolic of the constant threat of atomic destruction at 
any time.73 Ducking and covering became a cultural symbol of the 1950’s, and has served 
as the bedrock for much of the academic work on the atomic age in American culture. 
While Bert the turtle hiding in his shell appealed to America’s younger generation, the 
movie as a whole served to communicate the message that there existed real and concrete 
steps one could take to survive an atomic detonation. A scene depicting a family enjoying 
an afternoon picnic at the time of a nuclear attack show a mother and her children hiding 
under the picnic blanket, and the father shielding himself with a newspaper.74 This civil 
defense strategy widely known as “ducking and covering” was commonly known across 
the United States as Bert the turtle’s story was regularly told to classrooms all across 
American.  
 The flaws in such strategies strike one as comedic in retrospect. Indeed, it should 
be noted here that the majority of America did not believe that ducking and covering 
would actually save their lives in the event of a nuclear attack, yet Bert the turtle played a 
vital role in influencing American thought about the bomb in the early 1950’s. While 
America knew that hiding under a cotton blanket would not save one’s life from an atom 
bomb, it served to further convince the American public that civil defense was practical. 
Civil defense drills became regular practices in elementary schools across the United 
States, on par with modern day fire or tornado drills, and as Kenneth Rose observes, in 
the first decade after the Second World War, “a period of optimism prevailed that nuclear 
weapons had not greatly changed the basics of protecting the civilian population.”75 
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Consequently, as millions of American families pondered whether or not to construct a 
bomb shelter, the U.S. government began to take steps to further obscure the dangers of 
the atomic bomb, by emphasizing the hope that shelters provided.  
 While civil defense programs and shelter construction served to mislead the 
American public in regards to their relative safety in the event of a nuclear attack, the 
way in which the U.S. government contributed to the domestication of bomb shelter 
construction, and in some circumstances, assigned specific gender roles to aspects of its 
civil defense philosophy, contributed greatly to America’s flawed understanding of 
atomic weapons. In the early 1950’s “men and women conformed to traditional gender 
roles despite the growing pressures of consumerism, technology (especially applied to 
food and household products as well as to reproduction), and women’s emancipation.”76 
At the core of late 1940’s and early 1950’s American society was the family and its 
home, “the family seemed to be the one place where people could control their destinies 
and perhaps even shape the future.”77  
The centrality of the American home in the 1950’s, and the role of women as 
caretakers and homebodies is vital to understanding how the atomic bomb’s message was 
shaped by the U.S. government. The early civil defense campaign “was designed to 
inform the general public about the perils of atomic attack and about the ways and means 
to counter its effects. In consequence, homes and families became involved in atomic 
planning, catapulting women (as wives and mothers as well as household managers) to 
the forefront of civil defense.”78 As a result of this domestication of the U.S. shelter 
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program, the American public bought into civil defense as a realistic defense to the 
atomic bomb, when in reality, it served largely to provide comfort and acceptance to a 
nation facing the constant threat of a nuclear attack.  
The U.S. shelter program designed and implemented by the civil defense 
authorities lacked funding and never achieved the lofty goals set by its practitioners. The 
post-war U.S. civil defense program never truly got off the ground as a full-fledged 
government-run shelter program, but it did serve as a beacon of hope and optimism to the 
American public during the atomic age. There were many reasons for its shortfall yet 
perhaps the most significant reason for its failure was that it simply could not keep pace 
with modern technology. Laura McEnaney explains in her book Civil Defense Begins at 
Home that “policymakers and citizens found it difficult to assimilate the new scientific 
realities of the era.”79 Margot Henriksen took it a step further by specifically pointing to 
the Russian development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles as blowing into “limbo not 
only our present concept of civil defense, but the whole civil-defense idea.”80 While it is 
now widely known that most civil defense measures would never and could never have 
worked as they were designed and communicated to the American public in the late 
1940’s and early 1950’s, what is often overlooked by historians, is just how deceitful the 
U.S. government was while communicating its civil defense advisements and how such a 
program succeeded more as a tool of propaganda than it did as a practical defense 
measure.  
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Indeed, watching programs like Duck and Cover and reading pamphlets 
discussing how to best tend your yard to avoid atomic destruction serve as obvious 
examples of a U.S. government only concerned with propagating a bright atomic 
narrative, yet using those as examples serves only as conjecture and leaves plausible 
doubt. Indeed, it was in the best interest of the U.S. government to keep its citizenry 
holding on to some semblance of hope in the face of a nuclear attack. The alternative 
would be a public driven either by mass aggression demanding the annihilation of its 
primary threat, the Soviet Union, or a passive response that more or less accepted its fate, 
thus surrendering to the Soviets. There is little debate that the U.S. government actively 
kept some of the true horrors of the atomic bomb from its wider public, yet what is open 
to interpretation is whether that deceit was propagated to shape the American 
understanding of the atom bomb, or simply a strategy to quell public anxiety about a 
technology that was indefensible.   
Regardless of where one comes down in this debate, a close look at how the U.S. 
government approached issues such as radioactive fallout and a populace woefully 
misinformed of all of the dangers associated with atomic weapons reveals a pattern of 
decision making consistent with deceit. This deceit can be further supported by a 
statement made in the 1947 Crutchfield report, which concluded that: “Because many 
people do not understand the issues well enough to know why they approve or do not feel 
sure enough to take a categorical stand, it might be reasonably assumed that these people 
could be influenced with relative ease.”81 While such a statement does not definitively 
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prove the U.S. government actively lied to its misinformed public, it does reveal that such 
a strategy was explored and as we will see in the proceeding pages, utilized.  
 
RADIATION AND THE BRIGHT ATOMIC FUTURE NARRATIVE 
 While the U.S. government heavily influenced the way in which the American 
public viewed civil defense in the atomic age, it also mislead the public about the dangers 
associated with radiation. While the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
brought widespread destruction, the truly nightmarish feature of the atom bomb was the 
dispersion of airborne radiation. This invisible killer resulted in the deaths of thousands 
of Japanese civilians in the days and weeks following the bombing and by the late 1940’s 
and early 1950’s, the U.S. government took strategic steps to quell any potential civilian 
upheaval. Perhaps the most well-known example of this was the widespread concern 
about strontium 90 in the U.S. milk supply. Largely ignored by the U.S. government, 
strontium 90, a radioactive isotope produced by atomic testing, had been found in the 
U.S. milk supply in the 1950s and early 60’s. While the levels of strontium 90 found in 
the milk supply did not result in the immediate deaths of consumers, the U.S. 
government’s silence on the matter strikes one as alarming. While one may simply write 
off this silence as a government strategy aimed at protecting national security interests, 
the U.S. government employed an entirely different strategy when the effects of fallout 
threatened private industry.  
 Even as the American public was largely kept in the dark about the U.S. atomic 
testing practices and the potential radiological effects the tests posed, the Kodak film 
industry was given advanced notice of the U.S. nuclear tests in the southwest because of 
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their effects on its film development. As Andrew Goliszek notes in his book In the Name 
of Science, “were it not for irate customers taking their Kodak film back to stores and 
developing labs because it was fogged, no one would ever have known that a nuclear test 
in New Mexico had caused the spread of radiation to a small town in Indiana.”82 As Tim 
Barribeau notes, as early as 1946, the Kodak film industry discovered that “its packing 
materials were contaminated with the radioactive isotope iodine-131,” a result of the 
atmospheric atomic testing by the United States in the recent past.83 Kodak had linked 
this isotope to poor image development and as a result, “without publicly acknowledging 
that individuals had been exposed [the U.S. government] secretly assured the company 
that warnings would be issued in advance to any upcoming tests.”84 The U.S. government 
offered dates, times, maps, and other information regarding future atomic testing in hopes 
of staving off any potential damage to the film industry.  
While it may come as no surprise that the U.S. government provided a private 
industry with classified information in order to maintain its viability, what is troubling 
was that same government’s unwillingness to extend the same courtesy to the general 
public. Throughout the 1950s and 60s there was a growing fear that strontium 90, had 
found its way in the American milk supply. In 1958 the Committee on Nuclear 
Information (CNI) conducted a study exploring the link between atomic testing and the 
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amount of strontium 90 found in the baby teeth of young children.85 The study raised 
awareness about the potential dangers of strontium 90, made clear the link between 
atomic testing and fallout figures in America’s dairy belt, and sparked outrage among an 
American public that demanded answers. Answers eventually did come, albeit thirty 
years later when the Clinton administration explored nuclear testing and American 
radiological experiments conducted during the Cold War.  This obvious discrepancy 
between the government’s willingness to provide film manufacturers with advanced 
warning of atomic testing and its apprehension about addressing the rise of strontium 90 
in the U.S. milk supply were raised in a 1998 senate subcommittee meeting by Iowa 
Senator Tom Harkin who stated: 
In fact, the Government warned the entire 
photographic industry and provided maps and 
forecasts of potential containment. Where, I ask, were 
the maps for dairy farmers? Where were the warnings 
to parents of children in these areas? So here we are, 
Mr. Chairman. The Government protected rolls of 
film, but not the lives of our kids.86 
 
Senator Harkins pointed remarks about the U.S. government in the recent past 
speaks to the startling contradictory practices of the U.S. government in the 1950’s. 
Clinton himself echoed a similar sentiment when it was revealed that “thousands of 
human radiation studies had been conducted during the Cold War.”87 Such evidence is 
revealing in that it shows that while concerns raised by a private industry solicited an 
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immediate response by the U.S. government, legitimate fears raised by its citizens did 
not, further highlighting just how flawed the American governments handling of radiation 
exposure was.  
While the Kodak case speaks to a government unwilling to divulge information 
about radiation to its public, in some cases the U.S. government out right lied about the 
dangers it posed. In a 1947 report written about the observations and conclusions of 
Operation Crossroads, W.A. Shureliff, the historian of Joint Task Force One, purposely 
misrepresented the dangers of radiological exposure on animals that had been kept in the 
hulls of the ships during the Bikini testing. Shureliff wrote that although the majority of 
animals aboard the ships died from exposure to radiation, readers should note “that 
radiation sickness is essentially painless.”88 Such a blatant misrepresentation of the 
dangers of radiation is alarming in that it shows the government’s willingness to not only 
downplay the destructive capacity of atomic weapons, but in some cases intentionally lie 
about it. While the average American most likely would never have read Shureliff’s 
report, the document remains vital to understanding the motivations of the U.S. 
government when it came to shaping the American atomic reality.  
The U.S. government’s insistence on downplaying the threats posed by atomic 
weapons, and its own ability to protect its citizens from its awesome power speak 
volumes of how the American public formed such a flawed understanding of the 
technology. While much of the government’s message about the atomic bomb had been 
intentional and rooted in civil defense and testing, programs such as Atoms for Peace 
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serve as examples of ways in which the U.S. government began associating the atom 
bomb with a more humanitarian and hopeful message. Atoms for Peace, first introduced 
to the American public by Dwight Eisenhower in December of 1953, sought to change 
the language associated with the atomic bomb. Project Plowshare, one of the many 
programs to emerge out of Eisenhower’s Atom’s for Peace initiative, sought to put 
atomic weapons to civilian use. “Those who were part of or supportive of the program 
contented that ‘peaceful nuclear explosions’ or PNEs, could excavate harbors and canals, 
stimulate the production of gas and oil, provide storage facilities for water or fuel, help 
gain access to deeply buried ores, [and] create heat that could be captured for power 
production.”89 Indeed, the goals espoused in Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative 
were revolutionary and in many ways comparable to the lofty goals of President Wilson’s 
Highway project decades earlier.  
 While today we still bear witness to some of the positives features of Project 
Plowshare and the wider Atoms for Peace initiative, such as the widespread use of 
nuclear power, many of its other goals detailed above were never fully realized. Indeed, 
the Plowshare program was not created as a propaganda tool but was instead the product 
of a scientific community who “saw in themselves the personification of progress and 
modernity.”90 Atoms for Peace and Project Plowshare serve not as evidence of a U.S. 
government purposely misleading its public about the peaceful uses of the atomic bomb, 
but is instead proof of a government getting caught up in the very narrative it helped 
create. 
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 The evidence put forth in the preceding pages is proof of two things. First, the U.S 
government had a vested interest in how the general population viewed the atomic bomb. 
Whether it was the public’s understanding of its safety relative to the bombs destructive 
capacity, or the dangers posed by radioactive fallout from atomic testing, the Crutchfield 
and Shureliff reports, coupled with the Kodak film industry case study, reveal that the 
U.S. government had a vested interest in controlling the public’s knowledge of atomic 
weapons and, in some cases, took concrete steps to misinform its populous of the dangers 
this technology posed. Secondly, much like what was seen in chapter one, the U.S. 
government created a narrative about the bomb that was oftentimes out of touch with 
reality and while print media and popular magazines might reach a broader audience, the 
U.S. government’s aura of legitimacy and respect at the time was unrivaled.  
Since the very origin of governance, societal leaders throughout the world have 
had to deal with determining whether a full and honest presentation of ‘the facts’ would 
have a more detrimental effect on those they govern than would the presentation of a less 
than complete representation of reality. The goal of which would be to maintain peace 
and stability amongst the populace even though that well-being and sense of security may 
be nothing more than a façade. In the case of the atomic bomb and the U.S. government, 
there is an argument to made that a conscious decision was made to focus attention on the 
conceivably bright future associated with nuclear fission and avoid the fear, distrust, and 
potential for chaos that a full and honest accounting of the weapon might generate.  With 
full knowledge of the destructive potential of the atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb, it is 
at least conceivable that the American public would have realized that their government 
was incapable of achieving that fundamental responsibility of government, ensuring the 
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safety and well-being of those they govern. Indeed, during the early years of the Cold 
War, the government apparatus that had created the atomic bomb, still carefully 
controlled the message behind it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
VI.        CONCLUSION 
To study the development and deployment of the atomic bomb and the emergence 
of America’s atomic reality in the two decades following the Second World War “is to 
discover a complex set of stages in America’s accommodation to the atomic bomb, 
beginning with incomprehension and ending with something beyond dispassion, 
something closer to acceptance.”91 American society’s acceptance, however, was not the 
direct result of knowledge or a well-founded understanding of the new technology, but 
instead, was rooted in the widespread integration of everything ‘atomic’ in American 
culture in the first decade and half of the Cold War. The world had known about the 
atomic bomb for only a few years before Americans flocked to the Las Vegas strip to 
witness the mushroom cloud the shadow of which would eventually enfold American 
culture in the late 1940s and 50s. While the atomic bomb left physical scars on the 
scorched earth of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the legacy it left behind in the United States 
came in the form of a cultural revolution consisting of hundreds of movies, television 
shows, music, children’s toys and books and government programs, often celebrating a 
technology they simply did not fully understand.  
The constraints on a research endeavor that covers not only such a wide expanse 
of time, but also a seemingly endless ocean of source material are obvious. It would be 
premature to definitively assert that America’s atomic reality was formed and reached its 
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maturity in the ten to fifteen years of the Cold War based strictly on this work, let alone a 
three volume monograph. The stories explored in the preceding pages, however, should 
refocus how historians should look at the continuing evolution of the atomic bomb in 
American society. While it would be a mistake to ignore the thoughts and attitudes of 
American society towards the atomic bomb in the years after the scope of this research 
project, it would also be mistake to view the 1960s, 70s, and 80s as being anything but an 
outgrowth of the active early years of the U.S. nuclear program, where the origin of the 
American atomic reality can be traced.  
In many ways America’s flawed atomic reality, born in the early Cold War years, 
lingers on today as arms reduction proposals are lost in a sea of government bureaucracy 
and partisan divides. It is appropriate now, more than ever, to question how American 
society arrived at its atomic reality as United States’ nuclear stockpiles remain sealed in 
outdated underground tombs that harken back to a time when a simple mistake could 
have changed the world forever.  
America’s understanding of the atomic bomb and nuclear technology is flawed, in 
large part, because there never was an opportunity for it to develop in an atmosphere that 
included an abundance of comprehensive, unbiased information. The atomic bomb, and 
the promise of a bright and limitless future because of it, infiltrated every aspect of 
American society in the years after the Second World War: the dangers that should have 
defined the technology quickly became an afterthought.  
The results of this thesis project are not intended to purport that the American 
public has no fear of the atom bomb. Indeed, the fear of nuclear annihilation was what 
fueled the civil defense movement as films like Stanley Kramer’s “On the Beach” 
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imagined a world wrought by nuclear destruction. Yet today we live in a nuclear world 
that is far different from 1940s and 50s.  
Perhaps the most significant nuclear threat facing America today is not one posed by a 
global rival but could instead be manifested in the form of an atomic accident, similar to 
the events in Goldsboro North Carolina. The era of mutually assured destruction is over 
and has been replaced by a world that is arguably more dangerous in that it would force 
us to live through the horrors of a nuclear detonation, and the long-term effects associated 
with it. The nuclear age in which we live in today requires a well-rounded and thorough 
understanding of the atomic bomb, and this research project is an important first step in 
tracing the origin of the American atomic reality. 
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